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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Bradley D. Green appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Officer Garth Davis of the Hailey Police Department observed Green 
driving 38 mph in a 25 mph zone. (Tr., p.6, L.23 - p.7, L.2; p.11, L.21 - p.13, 
L.2.) After stopping Green for speeding, Officer Davis noticed that Green 
smelled like alcohol, slurred his speech, and had glassy and bloodshot eyes. 
Officer Davis asked Green to exit his vehicle and perform standard field 
sobriety tests. (Tr., p.17, Ls.21-24.) Green however, refused to perform the 
tests and demanded that his attorney be present. (Tr., p.17, L.25 - p.20, L.14.) 
Officer Davis told Green that he was not entitled to consult counsel at that time. 
(Tr., p.19, Ls.20-23.) Officer Davis then arrested Green for DUI.' (Tr., p.21, 
Ls.5-12.) 
Officer Davis transported Green to the intoxilyzer room of the Blaine 
County Jail. (Tr., p.21, L.20 - p.22, L.7.) Green refused to submit to the breath 
test. (Tr., p.24, L.21 - p.25, L.15.) Officer Davis then filled out an affidavit in 
support of a a warrant to draw Green's blood, which was transported to and 
signed by a judge. (Tr., p.26, Ls.8-16; p.27, Ls.13-16.) In the interim, Green 
The relevant citation indicated that Officer Davis arrested Green for "DUI 
Refusal" pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002(3). (R., p.4.) However, Officer Davis 
testified that he arrested Green for "DUI", and Green ultimately pled guilty to 
driving under the influence, in violation of I.C. § 18-8004. (Tr., p.21, Ls.5-12; R., 
pp.55-63.) The magistrate court found that Officer Davis arrested Green 
"ostensibly for refusing to submit to evidentiary tests." (R., p.43.) 
continued to request that he be permitted to consult his lawyer, but was not 
permitted to do so. (Tr., p.27, Ls.2-12.) 
Green was transported to a hospital where his blood was drawn. (Tr., 
p.27, L.13 - p.29, L.13.) He was then transported back to the Blaine County Jail, 
where he was booked, a process that was delayed by Green's lack of 
cooperation. (Tr., p.29, L.19 - p.30, L.6.) Green bonded out from jail at 4:40 am, 
approximately one hour and ten minutes after the blood draw.' (Tr., p.30, Ls.11- 
13; p.36, Ls.7-22.) 
Green filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained by Officer Green 
during the investigation, arguing that he was denied his right to consult with 
counsel during the attempted administration of the field sobriety tests, and after 
he was arrested, up until when he bonded out. (R., pp.17-19.) After a 
suppression hearing, the magistrate court denied the motion. (R., pp.36-38; 43- 
48.) Green entered a conditional guilty plea to DUI. (R., pp.55-63.) In its 
appellate capacity, the district court affirmed the magistrate court's denial of 
Green's motion to suppress. (R.  p.111) Green filed a timely appeal. (R., 
pp.113-116.) 
' The record does not indicate the results of the blood test, or whether the blood 
was actually tested. 
ISSUE 
Green states the issues on appeal as: 
A: WERE GREEN'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED 
WHEN HE WAS NOT ALLOWED TO COMMUNICATE 
WITH AN ATTORNEY DURING THE INITIAL STOP BUT 
MORE IMPORTANTLY AFTER THE EVlDENTlARY 
PROCEDURE FOR ALCOHOL TESTING WAS 
COMPLETED UP UNTIL HE WAS RELEASED FROM JAIL? 
B: DID THE MAGISTRATE ERR IN ITS REASONING WHEN 
IT DENIED GREEN'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS? 
C:  SHOULD GREEN'S BLOOD TEST RESULTS BE 
SUPPRESSED FROM EVIDENCE? 
(Appellant's brief, p.7 (emphasis and capitalization in original).) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Green failed to show that the magistrate erred in denying his motion to 
suppress? 
ARGUMENT 
Green Has Failed To Show That The Maqistrate Court Erred In Denvina His 
Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Green contends that the magistrate court erred in denying his motion to 
s~ppress.~ (& generally, Appellant's brief.) He alleges that his due process 
rights were violated when he was denied the opportunity to consult with counsel 
to arrange alternative testing during the officer's attempted administration of the 
field sobriety tests, and at all times after his arrest, excluding during the state's 
attempted administration of the BAC breath test. (Id.) 
Green's contention fails. While the ldaho appellate courts have 
recognized a statutory and due process right to contact an attorney in order to 
facilitate a DUI suspect's gathering of evidence after his submission to the state's 
evidentiary test, there is no statutory or due process right to contact an attorney 
before submitting to an evidentiary test. 
Green contends that all evidence and observations of Green's intoxication, 
including the odor of alcohol coming from Green during the traffic stop and 
Green's slurred speech, should be suppressed as a remedy for the alleged due 
process violation. (Appellant's brief, p.21.) However, if this Court does 
determine that Green's due process rights were violated, the only appropriate 
remedy, consistent with State v. Carr, 128 ldaho 181, 911 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 
1995), is the suppression of the state's blood test results, not the officer's 
observations that occurred prior to the alleged due process violation. id. at 185. 
See also State v. Cantrell, 139 ldaho 409,411, 80 P.3d 345, 347 (Ct. App. 2003) 
--("When a DUI detainee is denied additional testing by peace officers, the results 
of the evidentiary testing done by the state are inadmissible.") 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 ldaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 ldaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." Id. 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] afFirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." @. (citing Losser, 145 
ldaho at 670; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 ldaho 559, 633 P.2d 11 37 (1981)). 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 
141 ldaho 728, 729-730, 117 P.3d 142, 143-144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 
ldaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 11 17 (2004). 
C. Green Did Not Have A Riqht To Consult With Counsel Prior To The 
Blood Draw 
"The right of a defendant charged with an alcohol-related driving offense 
to obtain additional testing is derived from both statutory and constitutional 
sources." State v. Hedqes, 143 ldaho 884, 886, 154 P.3d 1074, 1076 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
Green cites I.C. Ij 18-8002, State v. Madden, 127 ldaho 894, 908 P.2d 
587 (Ct. App. 1995). and State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181, 911 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 
1995), for the proposition that he had a right to consult counsel at various times 
prior to the blood draw. (@ generallly Appellant's brief.) None of these 
authorities, however, extend this right to any time prior to when the DUI suspect 
actually submits to a state-administered intoxication test. 
ldaho Code § 18-8002(4)(e)~ provides, in relevant part: 
After submittina to evidentiarv testinq at the request of the 
peace officer, [a DUI suspect] may, when practicable, at his own 
expense, have additional tests made by a person of his own 
choosing. 
(emphasis added.) 
The plain language of I.C. Ij 18-8002(4)(e) provides a statutory right to 
procure additional tests, only after submitting to a peace officer's evidentiary 
tests. A DUI suspect does not have a right, under I.C. § 18-8002(4)(e), to 
interrupt the state's investigation to pursue his own. 
Prior to 2009, I.C. Ij 18-8002(4)(e) was codified as I.C. 18-8002(4)(d). The 
state will refer to this statute as I.C. Ij 18-8002(4)(e), even when referencing its 
application in appellate court opinions prior to 2009. 
In State v. Madden, 127 ldaho 894, 908 P.2d 587 (Ct. App. 1995), the 
ldaho Court of Appeals held that from the I.C. § 18-8002(4)(e) statutory right to 
procure additional testing and evidence after submitting to a peace officer's 
evidentiary test, necessarily follows a DUI suspect's right to contact an attorney 
to facilitate such testing and evidence gathering, even if the suspect is still in 
custody. Id. at 896. In Madden, the DUI suspect submitted to the state's breath 
test,5 then directly asserted her statutory right for an independent test and the 
opportunity to communicate with her attorney to arrange it. 4. at 895. These 
requests were denied by the attending police officers for several hours. Id. at 
895-896. The ldaho Court of Appeals held that the state thus violated I.C. 3 18- 
8002(4)(e), and that the appropriate remedy was suppression of the state's BAC 
test results. @. at 589-590. 
In State v. Carr, 128 ldaho 181, 911 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1995), Carr 
submitted to the state's breath test, and then requested to speak to a lawyer, but 
did not specifically request the opportunity to arrange an independent BAC test. 
Id. at 182-183. The ldaho Court of Appeals noted that because Carr, unlike 
-
Madden, did not specifically assert her statutory right to an independent BAC 
test, the "statutory issue is not squarely before us as it was in Madden." Id. at 
183. However, the Court held that even when the I.C. 3 18-8002(4)(e) right is 
not directly asserted, a DUI suspect has a Fourteenth Amendment due process 
right to consult with an attorney via telephone, upon request, after she submits to 
a state evidentiary test, in order to obtain an independent test or otherwise obtain 
Madden agreed to take a breath test, and blew a BAC of ,211. She refused to 
blow a second time. Madden, 127 at 896,908 P.2d at 589. 
a "fair opportunity to defend against the [sltate's accusations." Id. at 183-184, 
quoting Chambers v. Mississio~i, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). 
The Court, however, continued to recognize that like the statutory right of 
I.C. § 18-8002(4)(e), the companion due process right applied only after a DUI 
suspect actually submits to the peace officer's evidentiary test: 
[Tlhe only opportunity for a defendant in a DUI case to 
gather exculpatory evidence is within a reasonable time following 
arrest and administration of the [sltate's BAC test. As a result, 
when a person is arrested for DUI and aiven an evidentiarv BAC 
test, that person must be allowed, at a minimum, to make a phone 
call upon request to do so. 
Carr, 128 ldaho at 184, 911 P.2d at 777 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
-
Allowing an individual arrested for DUI to make a telephone 
call once the lsltate administers its evidentiarv BAC test ensures 
that the arrestee will be given the opportunity to obtain exculpatory 
evidence. 
Id. at 185. (emphasis added.) In State v. Shelton, 129 ldaho 877, 880, 934 P.2d 
-
943, 946 (Ct. App. 1997), the Court of Appeals noted that the issue in Madden 
and Carr was "the right to a second BAC test." (emphasis added.) 
Green contends the statutory right of I.C. § 18-8002(4)(e) as recognized 
by Madden, and the companion due process right illustrated in Carr, expand 
further, and that he had a right to consult with counsel during the officer's 
attempted administration of the field sobriety tests, upon his arrival at the police 
station after his arrest, and after he refused the state's BAC test. (See generally, 
Appellant's brief.) This assertion is contrary to the plain language of I.C. § 18- 
8002(4)(e), and is not supported by m, or any other authority presented by 
Green. Under I.C. 9 18-8002(4)(e), the Fourteenth Amendment, Madden, and 
Carr, the state is permitted to successfully administer an evidentiaiy test before 
-
the DUI suspect's right to pursue an alternative test takes effect. 
An argument similar to Green's was rejected by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court. In State v. Larivee, 656 N.W.2d 226 (Minn. 2003), Larivee, a DUI suspect, 
refused to submit to the state's evidentiary test, and instead directly requested 
that a person of his choosing be permitted to come to the jail to perform an 
independent test.6 id. at 228. The attending officer denied this request. @. 
Larivee argued that the state thus violated his statutory and constitutional due 
process right to an independent evidentiary test. Id. at 228-229. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court first endeavored to determine the extent of 
Larivee's statutory right to his own independent test. @. at 229. Minn.Stat. 3 
169.123, subd. 3(a) (2000),~ which is similar to I.C. § 18-8002(4)(e), states, in 
relevant part: 
The person tested has the right to have someone of the 
person's own choosing administer a chemical test or tests in 
addition to any administered at the direction of a peace officer; 
provided, that the additional test sample on behalf of the person is 
obtained at the place where the person is in custody, after the test 
administered at the direction of a peace officer, and at no expense 
to the state. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that because Larivee refused the 
state's evidentiary test, he was not a "person tested" under the statute, and thus 
Larivee was permitted to contact an attorney after he was read the Minnesota 
Implied Consent Advisory. Larivee, 656 N.W.2d at 228. Minnesota law, unlike 
Idaho law, allows a DUI suspect to consult with an attorney before making the 
decision whether to submit to a chemical intoxication test. Com~are Friedman v. 
Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Minn. 1991) with I.C. $ 18- 
8002(2). 
had no right to obtain an independent test. Larivee, 656 N.W.2d at 229. The 
Minnesota Supreme Court also recognized that the statutory phrases "in 
addition", "additional test", and "after the test administered," indicated that the 
statute was intended to grant a statutory right only to those who have first 
submitted to the police-administered test. Id. 
Similarly, I.C. 3 18-8002(4)(e) clearly intends, as illustrated by the phrases 
"after submitting to evidentiary testing," and "additional tests," to grant a statutory 
right only to those who have first submitted to the police-administered tests. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court next addressed the issue of whether 
Larivee's constitutional due process rights were violated by the denial of his 
request for an independent test. jcj. at 230. Applying California v. Trombetta, 
467 U.S. 479 (1984), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Minnesota 
Supreme Court held that because there was no evidence in the record that the 
alcohol-concentration tests administered by the state were inaccurate, there were 
no assurances that the independent test would be exculpatory, and therefore 
Larivee had no due process right to an independent test. Larivee, 656 N.W.2d at 
231-232. 
As noted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Larivee, "many other 
jurisdictions that have addressed this issue have found no due process violation." 
Id. at 232. State v. Zoss, 360 N.W.2d 523, 524 (S.D. 1985) ("If [the DUI 
-
suspect] had wanted possible exculpatory evidence, she could have consented 
to the breath test which may have been exculpatory and still had a chance of 
getting a possible exculpatory blood test. There is nothing fundamentally unfair 
in this procedure, nor did it deny her a 'meaningful opportunity to present a 
complete defense."'); People v. Dewey, 431 N.W.2d 517 (Mich. App. 1988); 
v. State, 494 S.E.2d. 229 (Ga. App. 1997) (holding that DUI suspect waived his 
constitutional due process right to an additional BAC test by refusing to take 
state's BAC test). But see State v. Swanson, 722 P.2d 1155 222 (Mont. 1986); 
Smith v. Cada, 562 P.2d 390 (Ariz. App. 1977); State v. Choate, 667 S.W.2d 11 1 
(Tenn. Crim. App.1983). 
This Court should follow the jurisdictions which have found that a DUI 
suspect does not have a constitutional due process right to refuse the state's 
evidentiary test and then immediately arrange his own. It is not fundamentally 
unfair to allow the state to successfully complete an evidentiary test before a DUI 
suspect is permitted to begin his investigation. If, as stated by the ldaho Court of 
Appeals in m, this right to further investigation is rooted in a DUI suspect's 
"interest in procuring evidence which would challenge the results of the [sltate's 
BAC test" (Wr, 128 ldaho at 184), it makes no sense for this right to apply 
before the state can actually successfully complete such a test. 
ldaho Code § 18-8002A(2)(f) requires the state to inform a DUI suspect, at 
the time of evidentiary testing, that "ialfler submitting to evidentiary testing you 
may, when practicable, at your own expense, have additional tests made by a 
person of your own choosing." (Emphasis added). If, as Green contends, a DUI 
suspect also has the right to refuse the state's evidentiary test and then 
immediately arrange his own, I.C. § 18-8002A(2) must be unconstitutionally 
misleading, as it would fail to adequately inform, and would perhaps mislead, the 
DUI suspect about the extent of his rights. Green has made no such contention. 
Green makes the additional argument that incorrect information relayed by 
the police officer to Green during the traffic stop somehow expanded his rights 
under I.C. § 18-8002(4)(e), Madden, and Gary. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-5, 9.) The 
arresting officer informed Green that he was not entitled to counsel during the 
officer's attempted administration of the field sobriety tests because of Idaho's 
implied consent statute. (Tr., p.18, L.18 - p.19, L.2.) The officer also informed 
Green that he was arresting him for refusing to submit to the field sobriety tests. 
(Tr., p.20, L.22 - p.21, L.4.) 
However, as the district court recognized, any erroneous information 
communicated by the officer had no effect on Green's actions, and in no way 
expanded Green's rights under I.C. § 18-8002(4)(e), Madden, and Gary. (Tr., 
p.41, L.5 - p.42, L.3.) Green has not explained how his rights were violated by 
these communications, or how they expanded his right to communicate with 
counsel for the purpose of facilitating an alternative BAC test. Even if the officer 
was mistaken about the consequences of Green's refusal to submit to the field 
sobriety tests, and did not clearly articulate the nature of the implied consent 
statute - Green still refused to submit to the tests. He was not tricked or 
otherwise unlawfully persuaded to submit to the tests. Further, there is no 
indication in the record, or argument from Green, that these communications 
unreasonably delayed the DUI investigation process. 
Green finally appears to contend that I.C. 3 18-8002(2), which provides 
that, "[A DUI suspect] shall not have the right to consult with an attorney before 
submitting to such evidentiary testing," provides, by implication, an affirmative 
statutory right to consult with counsel, and the reasonable means to do so, 
before and after refusing to submit to the state's evidentiary testing. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.11-12.) However, the plain language of I.C. 3 18-8002(2) provides no 
affirmative rights at all, and actually denies a DUI suspect the right to consult with 
an attorney until he submits to the state's evidentiary test. It does not follow, as 
Green contends, that "it is only during the time that Idaho Code § 18-8002 is 
being applied that [Green] does not have the right to counsel." (Appellant's brief, 
p.11.) 
Green did not have a right to consult with counsel for the purposes of 
arranging alternative testing and gathering evidence until, at the earliest, he 
actually took an evidentiary test administered by the state. This Court should 
affirm the magistrate's court denial of his motion to suppress. 
D. Green Has Failed To Show That His Due Process Riqhts Were Violated 
After The Blood Draw 
Green contends that he had a due process right to consult with counsel 
"up until the time that he was released from custody," presumably including the 
time after the blood draw when he was still in custody. (Appellant's brief, p.1) 
The contention, however, is not supported by argument or authority. When 
issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or 
argument, they will not be considered on appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 
923 P.2d 966 (1996). 
Further, the record is devoid of evidence that the state denied or materially 
interfered with Green's opportunity to contact counsel or make arrangements for 
additional testing once Green actually submitted to the blood draw. Sometime 
afler the blood draw, but before Green bonded out, Officer Davis, the only 
testifying witness at the suppression hearing, had lefl the Blaine County Jail and 
was back at his office. (Tr., p.30, Ls.11-18.) Thus, while Green bonded out of 
jail at 4:40 am, approximately one hour and ten minutes afler the blood draw, it is 
unclear from the record when, or whether, he was given access to a telephone 
prior to his release. Finally, the record indicates that Green's lack of cooperation 
in the booking process, in refusing to give Officer Davis his address or social 
security number, caused some delay between the blood draw and when Green 
bonded out. (Tr., p.29, L.22 - p.30, L.6.) 
Green has thus not adequately argued, and cannot show, that any right to 
arrange alternative testing was violated after the blood draw, and thus cannot 
show that the magistrate court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to aftirm the magistrate court's 
denial of Green's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 4th day of January 2010 
4-J- 5. - 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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